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Essay
Intro
By the Project for Excellence in
Journalism and Rick Edmonds of The Poynter Institute
There were high hopes in many quarters of the newspaper industry
in 2004. The 2000-2003 recession was expected to give way
to an economic rebound. Publishers expected advertising revenue
to come roaring back as it traditionally does in the early
stages of a recovery. Investors, who had bid up stock prices
based on newspapers' steady profitability and cyclical nature,
were expecting their ship to come in. Editors, faced with
deep cuts in 2001 and flat staffing and budgets since, were
looking for reinvestments in news gathering.
None of that turned out as planned. Ad revenues in 2004 did
increase, about 4% over all.
But the weakness in big-city markets and certain advertising
categories, together with dull overall performance, raised
questions about whether the industry had lost ad share to
electronic media and others. Investors were disappointed,
and by the end of the year newspaper stock prices were trailing
the market.
Perennial bottom-line pressures then redoubled. There was
an intense focus on cost controls, and the newsroom took its
share of hits. At its annual meeting in April, the American
Society of Newspaper Editors got the bad word that employment
of full-time news professionals actually declined by 500 positions
(about 1%) in 2003.
That more than wiped out modest gains of about 300 the year
before. And that came after the deep cut of 2,000 jobs in
2001. While the full numbers have not yet been tallied, cuts
appeared to outnumber expansions in 2004 budgets as well.
The Los Angeles Times had the indignity of being asked to
trim 60 newsroom positions by its parent, Tribune Company,
just months after winning five Pulitzer prizes.
(The Los Angeles market had an especially bumpy second quarter).
Yet perhaps the worst news came in circulation. A few companies
like McClatchy and individual newspapers like USA Today and
The Boston Globe showed healthy gains. But industry-wide losses
continued, and it became harder to argue, as some optimists
had, that at least the pace of erosion was slowing. Gannett
papers lost nearly 2% year to year, which management attributed
to new constraints on telemarketing.
But compounding the weak circulation story were admissions
over the summer that three big-city papers - the Chicago Sun
Times, Newsday, and The Dallas Morning News - had overstated
their paid circulation totals by tens of thousands of copies,
deceiving industry auditors in the process. Under the flamboyant
press lord Conrad Black (since deposed), the Sun Times's parent,
Hollinger, was considered something of a rogue operation within
the industry. Newsday and The Morning News were another story
- successes editorially and financially. The fraud was as
bad or worse at Newsday's sister Spanish-language daily, Hoy,
which bragged of passing an established competitor, El Diario/La
Prensa, after just five years - but did so with massive circulation
padding.
Tribune Company and Belo, parent companies of Newsday and
The Morning News, were profusely apologetic, and, while still
investigating how and how long the abuses happened, set aside
a total of more than $100 million to compensate advertisers.
The Audit Bureau of Circulations (ABC) censured the publications
and announced it would do tougher audits, tighten some of
the loosened regulations of recent years and review others.
That was a nod to the open secret within the industry that
"paid" covers a variety of deeply discounted sales
and trial subscriptions and that gaming the system has become
more common, masking the true slippage in fully paid subscriptions
and rack sales.
There were two bright spots in this otherwise cheerless picture:
the growth of newspapers' online sites and their continued
push into youth, Spanish-language and other targeted markets.
But even these carried a few cautionary footnotes.
Online advertising revenues at public newspaper companies
were up 30 to 60%.
Better yet, the companies have rallied nicely in online employment
advertising against their we-will-bury-you competitor, Monster.com,
which encountered some bumps in its own expansion strategy
as the newspaper sites fought back successfully on pricing
and with links to traditional in-paper advertising. The sites
are also venturing into lucrative new areas - auctions and
direct sales, search and "context" advertising (premium-priced
because it targets readers' interests according to the pages
they view - that had been the province of dot.com startups.
Still, many believe there is still too little that's exciting
about the news content and display of most online sites, often
not much more than an electronic rehash of the morning's paper.
Ad rates remain low, so the impressive revenue percentage
increases are on a small base. If, as seems inevitable, readership
shifts over time to online editions, it remains tomorrow's
challenge to figure out how to "monetize" the traffic
in anything approaching the profitable standards of traditional
newspapers.
As had been promised in late 2003, companies are forging
ahead with diversification into new kinds of publications
that seek to expand total audience. Free youth papers are
especially ubiquitous - it is not unusual to see announcements
of two or three launches in a single week. And a few companies
- notably Washington Post and E.W. Scripps - now have big
investments in separate growth businesses (educational services
for the Post, lifestyle cable networks for Scripps) of comparable
size to the newspaper division.
By contrast, the specialty publications are tiny in scale
and new enough that their revenue and profit prospects are
not clear yet. Only a few of the most ambitious - Tribune's
three Hoys and Red Eye, Belo's Quick and Al Dia, for example
- are big enough to rise to 1 or 2% of operating costs. Coincidentally
or not, these were two of the companies involved in circulation
padding and are feeling the worst sting of investor disappointment
with their performance.
For all the troubling trends, newspapers still deliver the
single largest audience in their markets and have by far the
greatest news-gathering capacity. Our content analysis confirms
that newspapers, when compared with television and online
offerings, continue to be the most thoroughly reported and
transparent source of news available, covering the widest
range of topics. Both audience and news investment can slide
or stagnate, as again was the case last year, and the newspaper
will remain the biggest game in town as media markets continue
to fragment. But if fair performance is good enough to hold
position, the edge of ambitious public-service reporting grows
blunter by the year - as even top newspaper company executives
now concede.
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Intro | Content Analysis | Audience | Economics | Ownership | News Investment | Public Attitudes | Conclusion | Charts & Tables
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Essay
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